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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The following issues are presented to this court on appeal: 
(1) Did the trial court err in finding that "Plaintiff 
accepted this settlement offer of $34,536.62" despite the express 
written provision of the offer that an acceptance would be 
effective only upon execution of a written agreement by the 
parties? A trial court's findings of fact are reviewed under a 
clearly erroneous standard, Alta Industries Ltd. v. Hurst, 846 P2d 
1282, 1286 (Utah 1983). See also Mountain States Tel. & Tel, v. 
Sohm, 755 P2d 155, 158-59 (Utah 1988). 
(2) Did the trial court err in failing to recognize and 
enforce the parties' express agreement that modifications to the 
January 1989 contract were to be made by separate written 
agreement signed by both parties? 
Interpretation of unambiguous terms of a contract is a matter 
of law which the appellate court reviews for correctness without 
any deference to the trial court's interpretation of the contract. 
Brown v. Weis, 871 P2d 552 (Utah App 1994); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Liberty Mutual Ins. Group, 868 P2d 110, 112 (Utah App 1994). 
(3) Did the trial court err in applying the principles of 
the legal doctrine of accord and satisfaction to conclude that 
HRCG owes Crouse $20,536.62 in addition to the $14,000 already 
paid? 
Interpretation and application of common law are questions of 
law which are reviewed for correctness with no deference to the 
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lower court's determination. Truiillo v. Jenkins, 840 P2d 777, 
778-79 (Utah 1992). 
(4) Did the trial court err in concluding that HRCG paid 
$14,000 in partial satisfaction of an accord? 
The standard of review is the same as in (3) above. See also 
United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park City Co., 870 P2d 880, 
885 (Utah 1993) (conclusions of law in civil cases are reviewed 
for correctness). 
(5) Did the trial court err in failing to apply the 
principles of contract law in making a determination of whether a 
modification or novation of the January 1989 contract had been 
properly accomplished or an accord clearly reached? 
Though the trial court did not enter a conclusion that the 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction applied rather than principles 
of contract law, it may be inferred that such a conclusion was 
reached. The standard of review is the same as in (4) above. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional or statutory provisions which are 
determinative as to the issues raised. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This dispute arises from a January 1989 contract for the 
performance of services between Human Resources Consulting Group, 
Inc. (HRCG) and Barbara Crouse in which Ms. Crouse agreed to 
provide consulting services and demonstrations on behalf of HRCG 
in turn for compensation pursuant to the terms of the contract. 
In November of 1989, the nature of the services provided by Crouse 
to HRCG changed. After the change, Crouse performed customer 
service work at the direction of HRCG until October 1990 at which 
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time she claimed that she was being undercompensated. 
The parties subsequently entered into negotiations for 
modification of the contract without entering into a written 
modification as required by the original contract. During the 
negotiations, HRCG responded to Crouse's need for money and, 
attempting to show good faith, paid to Crouse $14,000 pending a 
final agreement on the contract modification. A few days after 
accepting the money, Crouse notified HRCG that she had accepted 
employment with another company. She subsequently commenced legal 
action claiming she was owed a balance of $20,536.62 under a 
"negotiated compromise to the disputes over the Independent 
Contractors Agreement". 
It is important to note that plaintiff did not make a claim 
for breach of quasi-contract or for services rendered outside the 
contract. The sole argument is that the parties entered into a 
modification of the contract along with an accord and satisfaction 
pursuant to which plaintiff is owed additional money. 
The trial court entered judgment for Crouse based upon 
findings that (1) the parties had agreed that the liquidated 
amount of Crouse's claim was $34,536.62, (2) the parties had 
reached an accord (3) HRCG had made a partial satisfaction of the 
accord by paying the $14,000, and (4) the balance of $20,536.62 
was due to Crouse. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about January 15, 1989, Barbara Crouse entered into 
a contract with HRCG to provide consulting services and 
demonstrations on behalf of HRCG for which Ms. Crouse was to be 
compensated as an independent contractor (the "Agreement"). The 
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Agreement contained an express provision that it could be modified 
only by a written modification signed by both parties. R 5-8. 
2. In November 1989, the nature of the services provided by 
Crouse to HRCG changed. She now provided customer service work to 
HRCG clients, an additional task made possible by termination of 
another project she was working on pursuant to the contract. T 
15:18-23; 39:20 through 41:7. 
3. In October 1990 Crouse made a claim to HRCG that she was 
being undercompensated pursuant to the terms of the agreement. At 
the invitation of HRCG, Crouse submitting billings for 
approximately $48,600. R 52, referring to trial exhibits 3-8; T 
17:11-19, 18:15-24. 
4. HRCG questioned some of the invoices presented by Crouse 
and disputed the total amount due. Wishing to continue its 
working arrangement with Crouse, HRCG on October 2, 1990 prepared 
and presented to Crouse a "Compromise/Offer" which set forth 
HRCG's evaluation of the amounts due to Crouse, offered to pay 
$24,661.62 for services rendered, and proposed a contract 
modification for future services. T 105:23-25, 106:21-25; 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 9. 
5. On October 4, 1990, HRCG prepared and presented to Crouse 
a modified "Compromise/Offer". Plaintiff's exhibit 11. 
6. Both the October 2 and October 4 offers expressly pro-
vided that an acceptance of the offer would be effective only upon 
execution of a written agreement by the parties. 
7. HRCG did not want to be bound by anything short of a 
final written agreement and, to that end, the letters suggesting 
negotiation were sent unsigned. T 99:12-23, T 114:6-19. 
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8. HRCG's desire in negotiating with Crouse rather than 
relying on strict interpretation of the Agreement was motivated by 
a desire to satisfy Crouse and to permit the continuation of their 
contractual relationship. T 106:17-25, 110:10-12. 
9. On October 18, 1990 Crouse wrote a letter to HRCG 
indicating that she was in agreement with the terms of the October 
4 offer except for the provisions of paragraph 8c. T 24:12-25, 
25:1-13, 29:19-20. 
10. Subsequent to October 18, several handwritten changes 
were made to the face of the October 4 offer. No changes were 
made to the express provision that an acceptance would be 
effective only upon execution of a written agreement by the 
parties. T 114:6-9. 
11. On October 25, HRCG, recognizing Grouse's need for cash 
and operating in good faith that some contract modification would 
be reached, paid to Crouse $14,000 by way of check. T 113:15-23. 
12. On October 26, Crouse notified HRCG that she had 
accepted employment elsewhere. T 115:1-6. 
13. On October 31, HRCG, continuing the negotiation of the 
unliquidated sums claimed under the contract, made a modified 
offer to Crouse based on an evaluation of her invoices. T 115:7-
25,116:4. 
14. On or about November 1, 1990, HRCG received a letter 
from Crouse formally advising that she was terminating her 
contract and submitting final time and expense sheets. T. 116:5-
12. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is one governed by the law of contracts which has 
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clearly established guidelines applicable to all of the facts 
presented to the trial court. An unambiguous contract must be 
construed according to its terms and effect given to the 
provisions which were intended by the parties, at the time of 
contracting, which are to be controlling. 
The unambiguous contract between the parties provided that 
modifications to the contract are to be made only by written 
agreement signed by the parties. Negotiations for such a 
modification, amount to offers which, until accepted and put into 
writing by both parties, do not meet the requirement for a written 
modification. Verbal or partial acceptance of an offer is not 
sufficient acceptance to give rise to a modification or novation 
of the original contract. For example, it is black-letter 
contract law that an offer which is accepted with an exception is 
not a mirror image acceptance and legally amounts to a counter-
offer. 
The trial court did not properly apply the governing 
principles of contract law to this case. Instead, it found an 
acceptance of a settlement offer where there was no meeting of the 
minds or valid consideration and then erroneously applied the 
doctrine of accord and satisfaction to find that HRCG owed an 
amount beyond the amount already paid to Crouse. 
Under controlling contract law, there was no modification or 
novation of the original contract and no acceptance of a 
settlement offer. The judgment of the trial court should, 




THE EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S FINDING THAT HRCG HAD MADE A 
SETTLEMENT OFFER OR HAD AGREED TO AN ACCORD. 
The trial court found that Crouse and HRCG's president, 
Robert Thurston, had met to discuss paragraph 8c (the provisions 
of the October 4 offer which Crouse had rejected) and that 
Thurston had agreed to pay Crouse a sum of $34,536.62. 
Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff and Thurston 
met again to discuss paragraph 8c. In this 
meeting, Thurston agreed to pay Plaintiff an 
additional $5,625 from paragraph 8c. 
Thurston handwrote $5625 below the previous 
offer, and Thurston handwrote $34,536.62 at 
the bottom of the page. Plaintiff accepted 
this settlement offer of $34,536.62. 
Findings of Fact # 16, R 62. 
There is a large logical leap from the finding that HRCG's 
president had written some additional figures on a document which 
he treated as "discussion papers" to the finding that the 
handwritten numbers constituted a settlement offer. 
The evidence in support of these findings is slim. Crouse 
testified that Mr. Thurston had written the figures onto the 
October 4 letter. T 21:11-13, 26:9-11. She also testified that 
HRCG's president agreed to add $5,625 back into the contract and 
that $34,536.62 was the amount HRCG owed to her. T 26:4-8. She 
then testified that HRCG paid her $14,000 as the first payment on 
what HRCG owed her. T 27:18-25,28:1-3. 
Neither Crouse nor Thurston initialed the numbers giving any 
indication that they had agreed on the figures or that the amounts 
were in fact what HRCG owed to Crouse. 
Thurston considered the October 4 letter to be "discussion 
papers". T 114:18-19. As such, it would not be unexpected that 
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he would write on them during negotiations with Crouse. It is 
clear that Thurston intended that HRCG not be bound by any 
agreement which was not reduced to writing signed by both parties. 
T 114:3-19. This is confirmed by the language in the October 2 
and October 4 letters requiring a signed written agreement. That 
HRCG paid Crouse $14,000 is not significant and is an insufficient 
basis on which to form a conclusion that an accord had been 
reached. Crouse testified that it was not unusual for HRCG to pay 
her large sums in advance for items for which she had not yet 
submitted bills. T. 70:3-6. One such payment had been for 
$15,000. T 70: 7-25, 71:1-20. 
Mr. Thurston testified that he had not made oral 
modifications to the Agreement. T99:20-23. He also testified 
that HRCG would, from time to time, make payments to Crouse for 
amounts for which she had not submitted time records or invoices. 
T 100:1-8. Thurston disputed Crouse's claim that he made the notes 
on the October 4 letter on which the court bases its finding. T 
108:12-25. Thurston testified that he did not agree to a 
compromise offer, T 114: 3-5, and that he would not have entered 
into a compromise offer not signed by both parties. T 114:6-19. 
Thurston testified that on October 26, after the alleged accord 
and after the $14,000 payment, Crouse came to him wanting to know 
what he was willing to agree to. T 114:23-25. He told her HRCG 
could not pay any more money until he had received invoice 
billings for the time period in question so they could continue to 
negotiate the matter. T 115:1-6. This does not support a finding 
that a settlement had been reached, but leads instead to a 
conclusion that the parties had not arrived at a final agreement. 
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That Thurston may have written figures on the document which 
the parties were negotiating is clearly not determinative. If 
this were the case, no party negotiating a contract would ever 
dare write something on a draft or working copy of the contract 
for fear that it would be construed against him as an agreement on 
his part. The overall weight of the evidence does not support the 
trial court's finding that an accord had been entered into by HRCG 
and Crouse. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY APPLY 
PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW TO THE FACTS OF 
THIS CASE. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE AND ENFORCE THE 
PARTIES' EXPRESS WRITTEN AGREEMENT THAT MODIFICATIONS TO THE 
JANUARY 1989 CONTRACT BE MADE ONLY BY SEPARATE WRITTEN 
AGREEMENT SIGNED BY BOTH PARTIES. 
The Agreement which underlies this entire dispute contains an 
express provision requiring any changes to the Agreement be in 
writing and signed by both parties. R. 8 Admittedly, Utah law 
permits oral modification of such agreements "in appropriate 
circumstances". Prince v. R.C. Tolman Const. Co., Inc., 610 P2d 
1267f 1269 (Utah 1980). However, it is clear that HRCG did not 
attempt to enter into an oral modification or supplemental 
contract. Both of HRCG's "compromise" offers (Oct 2 and Oct 4) 
contained language clearly indicating its intent that the 
agreement be executed in writing in order for the modification to 
be binding. Further, to avoid any possibility that the offers be 
considered binding writings, Thurston intentially sent the letters 
without signing them. If the parties clearly do not want to be 
bound by legal consequences of negotiations until an agreement has 
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been signed, there can be no agreement. 
There does not appear to be any doubt that if 
the parties make it clear that they do not 
intend that there should be legal 
consequences unless and until a formal 
writing is executed, there is no contract 
until that time. 
Engineering Associates v. Irving Place Associates. 622 P2d 784, 
787 (Utah 1980), citations omitted, emphasis added. 
The evidence at trial, supported by the language in the Oct 2 
and Oct 4 letters, leads to the conclusion that HRCG did not wish 
to enter into an enforceable agreement absent a writing signed by 
both parties. 
Q. . . . Did you at that time agree to any 
compromise offer? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Would you have made any 
compromise offer if it had not been in 
writing signed by both parties? 
A. I would not. 
Q. And why would you not? 
A. Well, based on several things. My prior 
experience with other people that had 
worked with our firm, my current 
arrangement, every single letter that I 
sent Ms. Crouse says all changes need to 
be made in writing signed by both 
parties. That was the way we were 
operating under this agreement. That is 
why even on these letters that were sent 
they were not signed by me because they 
were merely discussion papers for us to 
look at. 
T 114:3-19. 
The trial court failed to recognize that (1) it was the 
intent of HRCG that all modifications and subsequent agreements be 
in writing, (2) it was the intent of HRCG that the "compromise" 
discussions not result in a binding agreement until reduced to 
writing signed by both parties, and (3) that HRCG's actions 
related to the Agreement and to the alleged settlement 
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consistently support their desire not to be bound until something 
had been written and signed by both parties. By failing to 
recognize and apply the intent of the parties that any subsequent 
agreements be signed by the parties, the trial court failed to 
properly apply contract law principles to this case. 
B. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CROUSE AND HRC6 REACHED 
A SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FOR $34,536.62. 
Although plaintiff argued the inapplicable doctrine of accord 
and satisfaction (T 97:1-4, 161:5-8), the trial court apparently 
applied the law of executory accord in reaching its decision.1 
The law of executory accord, however, is merely the law of 
contracts as applied to negotiation of substituted performance 
under an existing agreement. 6 Corbin on Contracts, §§ 1268-1275; 
Estate Landscape v. Mountain States Tel & Tel, 844 P2d 322, 326 
(Utah 1992). An offer to negotiate substituted performance does 
not give rise to an accord. Id., § 1270. The same elements 
required to establish the existence of a contract are required to 
demonstrate an enforceable accord, i.e.. offer, acceptance, 
consideration, etc. 
HRCG's letters of October 2 and 4 can reasonably be construed 
as offers. In order for those offers to become a contract, one of 
them must be unconditionally accepted. Ms. Crouse rejected the 
October 2 offer and accepted the October 4 offer except for the 
provisions of paragraph 8c. A conditional or limited acceptance 
1
 Accord and satisfaction is a common law doctrine invoked 
as a defense in which a party may show that performance was 
discharged by substituted performance agreed to by both parties. 
In essence, the law of executory accord amounts to the first half 
of the doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 
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of an offer is a rejection and a counter-offer. Wadsworth 
Construction v. City of St. George, 865 P2d 1373, 1376 (Utah App 
1993), citing Candland v. Oldrovd 67 Utah 605, 248 P 1101, 1102 
(1926). An offer must be accepted in its entirety with no 
reservations to constitute a contract. 
The offeree must "manifest a definite 
intention to accept the offer and every part 
thereof . . . without material reservations 
or conditions." 
Wadsworth at 1376, citing R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child. 122 Utah 
194, 247 P2d 817, 819 (1952). Crouse's acceptance of the offer 
except for the provisions of paragraph 8c is therefore not a 
valid, binding acceptance. 
Crouse testified that she and Thurston subsequently 
negotiated over paragraph 8c and reached an agreement as to that 
provision. At trial, Crouse provided no evidence that the 
language in the written offer requiring a writing signed by the 
parties was challenged, negotiated or changed in any way. It is 
improper for the trial court to assume, absent any evidence 
supporting the assumption, that HRCG's frequently demonstrated 
desire that its offer include the express requirement of a writing 
was no longer a part of the offer when Crouse accepted it. 
There is no evidence as to who made the final "offer" in the 
negotiations which led to resolution of the dispute over paragraph 
8c. If Crouse did so, then the finished product was an offer by 
Crouse to HRCG, containing all of the language in the October 4 
letter, including the requirement for a signed writing. If HRCG 
made the last offer, then that same language applied to the offer 
of HRCG to Crouse. 
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Crouse testified at trial that she did not enter into a 
written agreement and that she considered resolution of the 
paragraph 8c issue to be the final element of an agreement between 
the parties which required no further action. T 43:17:25,45:25 
to46:14, 94:25 to 95:2. It is clear from the evidence that Crouse 
did not unqualifiedly accept the offer which included the language 
requiring the agreement to be in writing. That limited 
acceptance, excluding a provision material to the offeror, is not 
a valid acceptance. 
It is significant that, even after Crouse had concluded the 
matter to be resolved, HRCG continued to negotiate, offering a 
subsequent settlement offer based upon newly acquired facts. The 
evidence shows that HRCG had not reached an agreement that the 
matter had been settled. There was simply no meeting of the minds 
as required by law. 
If, as characterized by the trial court's memorandum 
decision, the offer was one "accepted" by Crouse then it was 
accepted with the condition that no legal obligation ensue until 
the agreement be reduced to a writing signed by both parties. 
Neither Crouse nor any agent of HRCG signed such a writing. 
Regardless of which party was the offeree of the last offer, 
the evidence clearly shows that neither Crouse nor HRCG accepted 
the offer in its entirety without conditions or reservations. 
Lacking a proper acceptance, no contract was or could be formed. 
Therefore, as a matter of law, there was no accord reached by the 
parties. 
A second requirement which must be satisfied in order to 
conclude that an enforceable accord existed, is evidence of the 
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existence of contractual consideration or an accepted substitute 
for consideration. There is none in this case. 
If a claim is undisputed and liquidated, traditional 
contractual consideration must be present to support an accord. 
Estate Landscaping at 326. Where the claim is disputed and 
unliquidated, some substitute for consideration, e.g., legal 
detriment, must be present to support the accord. Id. For 
example, surrender of a legal right to dispute the amount at issue 
satisfies the consideration requirement. Id. In the case of an 
accord, an agreement without a relinquishment of a right to press 
a bona fide dispute over an unliquidated amount causes the accord 
to fail for lack of consideration. Id. 
There is no evidence that Crouse was attempting to enforce 
any contractual right. She never threatened or otherwise 
discussed legal action. Apparently, her only bargaining lever was 
the threat to terminate her relationship with HRCG. The evidence 
does show that HRCG entered negotiations with Crouse, willing to 
pay more than it thought it was responsible for under the 
Agreement, because it wished to continue the working relationship 
with Crouse. In other words, the consideration for HRCG to 
negotiate the disputed amounts was Crouse's continued contractual 
relationship with the firm. It is clear that this same 
consideration was not part of Crouse1s bargaining motivation. Her 
sole motivation, according to her testimony, was to get the sums 
she thought she was owed and not to liquidate the disputed amounts 
or relinquish any disputed rights. T 46:23-25. 
There is no provision in the accord, express or implied, in 
which the parties relinquish their right to dispute the 
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unliquidated amounts. The sole consideration on HRCG's part, 
Crouse's continued contractual relationship with the firm, failed 
within days after the alleged accord. In fact, it appears from 
the record that Crouse had already sought new employment and may 
have already accepted a job prior to the October 18 meeting. 
Lacking legal consideration, the accord fails and is unenforceable 
as a matter of law. 
Contract law imposes contractual obligations only where a 
valid offer has been accepted without qualification or reservation 
and the ensuing agreement has legal consideration. The same 
requirements exist for finding a valid, enforceable accord. In 
the present case both the acceptance and consideration 
requirements fail. The trial court, therefore, erred in finding 
that HRCG had accepted the settlement offer creating an accord. 
CONCLUSION 
The weight of the evidence fails to support the trial court' s 
finding that the parties had entered into an accord. In fact, the 
overwhelming evidence is that HRCG's words and actions not only 
failed to demonstrate an agreement had been reached, but were 
consistent with its desire that no agreement be effective until 
placed into a writing signed by the parties. Aside from the 
factual question, the trial court failed to apply fundamental 
principles of contract law in evaluating the issues before it in 
this case. It is clear that HRCG did not intend legal 
consequences to flow from its discussions with Crouse until an 
agreement had been written and signed by the parties. It is also 
clear that there was no meeting of the minds. There was no 
unqualified acceptance of the offer as written and no legal 
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consideration to support an accord. As a clear matter of law, 
there was no enforceable accord between the parties. 
/Of 
Respectfully submitted this l M day of March, 1995. 
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